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Abstract  
This article provides an analysis of how banks determine levels of information
production when they are in imperfect competition and there is a condition of
information asymmetry between borrowers and banks. Specifically, the study
concentrates on information production activities of banks in duopoly where they
simultaneously determine intensity of pre-loan screening as well as interest rates. The
preliminary model of this paper illustrates that due to strategic complementarities
between banks, banking competition can result in inferior equilibrium out of multiple
equilibria and insufficient information production. Policymakers must take into
account the possible adverse effects of competition-enhancing policies on
information production activities. 
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Imperfect Competition and Costly Screening in the Credit Market 
under Conditions of Asymmetric Information 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been observed in both developed and developing countries that faster loan 
growth coincides with higher loan losses in the banking industry. Examples include 
Thailand in the middle of the 1990’s, Scandinavian countries in the early 1990’s, and 
Japan in the late 1980’s. In the literature of financial crises, such phenomena are often 
attributed to financial liberalization and the moral hazard of banking1. This paper 
suggests imperfect competition as the background of higher loan losses in the 
aftermath of lending booms. From this viewpoint, it can be argued that when the 
economy is in a boom period and banks compete in expanding loans, competition may 
lead banks to reduce costly information production on borrowers in order to undercut 
rivals. This then results in higher loan losses. 
This study concentrates on information production activities of the banks in 
imperfect competition as viewed within the framework of the Hotelling-Bertrand 
duopoly model. Not only do banks simultaneously set interest rates, but they also 
interact strategically to determine the intensity of pre-loan screening in the presence of 
information asymmetry on the borrower’s business risk. Intensifying pre-loan 
screening improves the quality of the loan portfolio by allowing the bank to distinguish 
good from bad projects. At the same time, such screening creates deterioration in the 
quality of the pool of applicants of the rival bank ceteris paribus because then low 
                                                  
1  McKinnon and Pill [1998] provides a theoretical analysis; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache [2001] as well as Hutchison and McDill [1999] provide an empirical 
analysis. 
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quality rejected firms are likely to flow to the rival bank. 
There is a trade-off when intensified pre-loan screening is costly, and banks 
redirect a part of the costs on the lending interest rate. While intensified screening 
improves the quality of the loan portfolio, the associated rise in the interest rate to 
cover the costs of this screening decreases the bank’s share of the credit market. Often, 
one bank may choose strategies in consideration of similar strategies on the part of its 
rival. Such strategic complementarities between banks can bring about multiple 
equilibria, and may also result in inferior equilibrium in terms of social welfare in 
situations where sufficient information production activities are not undertaken. In 
such cases, policy intervention is required to improve social welfare. 
The bulk of literature on the analyses of credit markets under uncertainty and 
imperfect competition focuses either on information problems or on imperfect 
competition2. Among the relatively few studies that address both information problems 
and interaction of bank strategies3, some attention has been given to pre-loan screening 
by banks and to the externalities of one bank’s strategies on those of others. Broecker 
[1990] studied the relation between the number of banks in the market and their 
profitability. He viewed cases where banks perform imperfect pre-loan screening on 
loan applicants, and rejected applicants can hang around to apply repeatedly to other 
banks. In such cases, he found that an increase in the number of banks would make the 
quality of the pool of applicants for individual banks worse, and this in turn would lead 
                                                  
2 For a comprehensive survey of the literature, see Freixas and Rochet [1997]; Chapter 
3 concerns imperfect competition and Chapter 5 includes information problems in 
credit markets. The adverse selection problem is usually discussed with either a 
monopolistic bank or a perfectly competitive market, so the interaction of banks is out 
of consideration. Examples include Besanko and Thakor [1987], and Stiglitz and Weiss 
[1981]. In the analyses that concentrate on interaction of banks, the information 
problem is often subtracted as in Chiappori et al. [1995] and Yanelle [1997]. 
3 Among others, Dell’Ariccia [2001] and Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr [1999] fall into 
this category.  
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to deterioration in the quality of loan portfolios and profitability of banks. Shaffer 
[1998] and Hyytinen [2003], among others, took into account standardized credit 
scoring and the common database among banks on borrowers. They extended the 
above analysis by looking at the correlation between screening processes of individual 
banks and the impacts of such correlation on borrower behavior. While they succeeded 
in clearly representing the strategic interaction of banks in the presence of adverse 
selection, their analyses handled screening intensity as exogenous. 
This study treats the intensity of the pre-loan screening as endogenous, and seeks 
to shed light on information production of banks under imperfect competition4. With 
similar interest, Gehrig [1998] compared equilibrium intensity of pre-loan screening in 
monopolies and in duopolies. He argued that introducing competition might lead to 
sub-optimal screening intensity. In his analysis, however, competition in duopoly 
simply results in the Bertrand competition of zero-profit equilibrium with no costly 
screening. In contrast, the present study illustrates the relation between screening 
intensity and the costs and accuracy of screening. It seeks to confirm the conditions for 
equilibrium with sufficient information production. 
This article is organized as follows; Section 1 describes the background of the 
model.  Section 2 involves the derivation of equilibrium with banking competition 
and evaluates the stability of such equilibrium. A comparison of the level of 
equilibrium from the viewpoint of social welfare is also given. Section 3 concerns the 
relation of information production with economic conditions and the intensity of 
competition, indicating that, competition enhancing policies can be associated with 
                                                  
4 Hauswald and Marquez [2003] deal the similar problem, while they apply the 
framework of auction game. Investing in pre-lending screening leads the bank to 
information advantage, and allows her to avoid ‘winner’s curse’ in lending rate bids. 
The bank with the information advantage would acquire positive profits. However, 
their analysis does not comprise the adverse selection problem. 
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loan growth and insufficient information production. This section also explores a 
possible policy scheme to prevent the banking competition from sticking to inefficient 
equilibrium with insufficient information production. Section 4 includes a summary 
and conclusion. 
 
 
1. MODEL 
 
1.1 Environment 
The credit market is viewed within the framework of the Hotelling-Bertrand 
competition model. In this model, there are two banks and a continuum of firms. The 
number of firms is normalized to unity, and firms are thus distributed uniformly on a 
line of length one. A bank is located at each end of the line. All agents have risk-neutral 
preference. 
 
1.2 Firms 
Each firm has a project that requires one unit of good as input. Firms do not possess 
any funds, so they apply for loans from banks in order to finance their projects. 
Projects are completed in one period. When a project is successful, it yields λ  
( 1>λ ) units of goods. When it fails, the output is zero. There are two types of firms, 
good and bad. The probability of success for the projects of a good type firm is one. 
The probability of success for a bad type firm is p, and its probability of failure is 1-p. 
The bad type’s project is not viable5. For simplicity of analysis, we assume . 0≅p
                                                  
5 That is, λλ <<⋅ 1p . Nonetheless, under limited liabilities, bad type firms have a 
demand for loans since their expected profits in the success state are positive. 
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Knowledge of whether a firm is good or bad is private. A firm is aware of whether it is 
a good or bad type, but others do not know this information. The proportion of good 
types and bad types in the population is represented by )1(: θθ − , and this is common 
knowledge. Both good and bad type firms are distributed uniformly on the line. The 
parameters λ  and θ  can be regarded as indicators of the economic condition; a 
boom period is associated with higher λ  and θ .  
 
1.3 Banks 
Two banks compete with each other in the credit market by setting lending interest 
rates simultaneously. However, they can acquire deposits perfectly elastically at the 
exogenous deposit interest rate dr .6 Banks also simultaneously choose the intensity of 
pre-loan screening. For clarity of analysis, the choice is restricted to be binary 
(screening or no-screening). Pre-loan screening enables banks to distinguish good 
projects from bad ones. However, the screening technology is imperfect. While good 
type firms are always identified correctly, a proportion ε  ( 10 <≤ ε ) of bad type firms 
are misidentified as good type firms. The cost of screening for each firm is α  
( 0>α ), regardless of its true type. 
Following Chiappori et al. [1995] and Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr [1999], it is 
assumed that from the borrower’s perspective, borrowing incurs a transaction cost per 
unit of loan (i.e., traveling cost), and this cost is in proportion to its distance with a 
creditor. Denoting the distance between a firm and that firm’s creditor bank with d, the 
transaction cost is depicted as , where t is the coefficient of transaction costs. The 
following relation is assumed between this coefficient and screening costs; 
dt ⋅
                                                  
6 In the context of a small open economy, the exogenous deposit interest rate would be 
considered the foreign interest rate. 
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  t⋅< θα
3
.       (A1) 
This condition implies that the screening cost is relatively small compared with the 
transaction cost. Further, it is assumed that transaction costs emerge at the time of 
repayment, but a loan application does not cost a firm anything. Finally, when the loan 
application of a bad type firm is rejected by a particular bank, it can apply to the other 
bank, because information acquired through screening is not shared between the two 
banks in any credible way. Still, it cannot apply again to the bank that has rejected it 
once. 
 
 
2 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
 
This study focuses on equilibrium of banking competition with pure strategies. 
 
2.1  Three States of Banking Competition 
As screening is costly, banks will make a strategic decision as to whether or not they 
want to carry it out. Accordingly, three states are possible; (1) both banks do not carry 
out screening, (2) both banks carry out screening, and (3) one bank carries out 
screening while the other does not. Firms conjecture credit examination policies of two 
banks by looking at the interest rates they offer. 
 
(1) Non-screening Equilibrium 
In this, banks can save the costs of screening, but they cannot reject loan applications 
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of any firm type. The lending interest rate of the bank on the left (right) side of the line 
can be denoted as  ( ). A firm may compare the lending interest rates of two 
banks as well as the distance with banks. That firm may then choose the bank on the 
left (Bank L) when the effective cost is the lower than if it borrowed from Bank R; 
Lr Rr
 
 )]1([)( LRLL dtrdtr −⋅+−≥⋅+− λλ ,    (1) 
where  (Ld 10 << Ld ) is the distance between the firm and Bank L, and  is the 
transaction cost when the firm borrows from Bank L. Solving (1) with respect to  
yields 
Ldt ⋅
Ld
 
 1
2
0 <−+=<
t
rrtd LRL .      (1’) 
Ld  can be interpreted as Bank L’s share in the credit market. This share increases as a 
function of the rival bank’s lending rate, and it decreases relative to its own lending 
rate.  
Bank L’s profit function can be described as follows; 
 
L
d
L
d
LL drrprr ⋅−⋅⋅−+−⋅≡Π )]()1()([ θθ ,   (2 a) 
where dr  is the exogenous deposit interest rate, θ  is the proportion of good type 
firms in the population, and p is the probability of success for a bad type firm. 
Analogously, Bank R’s profit function can be described as 
 
)1()]()1()([ L
d
R
d
RR drrprr −⋅−⋅⋅−+−⋅≡Π θθ .   (2 b) 
Banks maximize their profit with respect to lending interest rates. Deriving the reaction 
function of each bank, the equilibrium lending interest rate and profits are calculated as 
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follows: 
 
θθθ
dd
RL
rt
p
rtrr +≅⋅−++== )1( , 
22
])1([ ttp
RL
⋅≅⋅⋅−+=Π=Π θθθ . 
The approximation is based on the assumption that 0≅p . It can be seen that the 
lending interest rate rises proportionally with the coefficient of transaction costs, t. 
This coefficient can be interpreted as an indicator of the oligopolistic market power of 
each bank. The higher t is, the higher the oligopolistic profits of the bank. The lower 
θ , the higher the lending interest rate.  
 
(2) Screening Equilibrium 
When both banks carry out pre-loan screening, they can distinguish the bulk of bad 
type from good type firms and reject unprofitable loan applications. However, those 
firms that are rejected by one bank will apply to the other bank. Taking into account 
such re-applications of bad type firms, the profit function of Bank L is described as 
 
)1(])([)1()1(])()()1[( L
d
LL
d
L
d
LL drrpdrrrrp −⋅−−⋅⋅⋅−⋅−+⋅−−⋅+−⋅⋅⋅−=Π αεεθαθεθ
 
        (3) 
The first term refers to the profits from those firms who first apply to Bank L. It 
includes deficits relative to bad type firms, profits made from good type firms and 
screening costs. The second term refers to deficits due to bad type firms who are 
rejected first by Bank R. The equilibrium interest rate and profits are derived next; 
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αθ
εθθ
θ
εθθ ⋅⋅−++⋅⋅−++≅= )1()1(
2
d
RL rtrr , 
)()1()1(
2
αεεθθ +⋅⋅−⋅−−⋅≅Π=Π dRL rt . 
It can be seen that banks redirect the costs of funds and screening into the lending rate. 
In comparison with non-screening equilibrium, the lending rate can be higher or lower 
depending on the cost of screening relative to the deposit rate, the accuracy of 
screening, and the proportion of good types in the population of firms. The profits of 
banks are unambiguously smaller in screening equilibrium than in that of 
non-screening equilibrium. 
 
(3) Asymmetric Equilibrium 
In this state, bad type firms tend to concentrate on the non-screening bank, while the 
screening bank raises the lending rate and looses a portion of good type borrowers. For 
bad type firms, the order of applying to the two banks depends on the following 
inequality; 
 
)]1([)]1([)1()( SNSNSS dtrpdtrpdtrp −⋅−−⋅≥−⋅−−⋅⋅−+⋅−−⋅⋅ λλελε
 
         (4) 
Subscripts S and N refer to the screening bank and the non-screening bank, respectively. 
LHS indicates that a bad type first applies to the screening bank, and with the 
probability of ε−1  it is rejected and then re-applies to the non-screening bank. RHS 
shows the expected profits of directly applying to the non-screening bank. When the 
inequality holds, a bad type first applies to the screening bank. Rearranging terms 
yields the same expression as (1’). For good type firms, the share of the screening bank 
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is also given as 
t
rrtd SNS 2
−+= . 
From these, the profit function of banks can be formulated; 
 
S
d
S
d
SS drrprr ⋅−−⋅⋅⋅−+−−⋅=Π ]})([)1()({ αεθαθ ,   (5a) 
S
d
NS
d
N
d
NN drrpdrrprr ⋅−⋅⋅−⋅−+−⋅−⋅⋅−+−⋅=Π )()1()1()1()]()1()([ εθθθ , 
         (5b) 
where  and  represent the profits of the screening bank and non-screening 
bank, respectively. First order conditions are  
SΠ NΠ
 
0
2
])1([
2
)( =⋅⋅−+−−⋅−⋅−+=∂
Π∂
t
rr
t
rrt
r
d
SSN
S
S εθθαθθ ,  (6a) 
 0
2
])1([
2
)( =⋅⋅−+−⋅−⋅−+=∂
Π∂
t
rr
t
rrt
r
d
NNS
N
N εθθθθ .  (6b) 
Each bank sets the lending rate at a level that will make the sum of the marginal 
increase in the revenue from individual loan contracts equal with the marginal cost that 
is associated with a decline in market share. Due to screening cost α , the marginal 
return per market share is smaller for the screening bank. In other words, the marginal 
cost associated with a decline in market share is smaller for the screening bank. In 
contrast, the non-screening bank eventually accepts the bulk of the bad type firms 
regardless of the interest rate it offers. Therefore, when it comes to the marginal cost of 
a decline in market share, it is higher than that of the screening bank. As a result, the 
non-screening bank sets the lending rate lower than that of the screening bank. 
Solving the problem yields the equilibrium lending rates and profits of the two 
banks: 
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θ
α
θ
θεθ
3
2)1( +−⋅++≅ dS rtr , 
2
32
1 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅⋅≅Π
αθθ ttS  
 θ
α
θ
θεθ
3
)1( +−⋅++≅ dN rtr , 
 dN rtt
⋅−⋅−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +⋅⋅≅Π )1()1(32
1 2 εθαθθ  
Because of the lower lending rate, the non-screening bank acquires the larger market 
share. However, bad type firms tend to concentrate on this non-screening bank, and the 
net effects on profits depend on the cost and accuracy of screening, α  and ε . 
 
2.2  Nash Equilibrium 
Nash equilibrium can be selected among the above-listed equilibria. Banks’ payoff in 
each state is summarized in the following matrix. 
 
Table 1. Banks’ Payoff Matrix 
 
      Bank R 
 N (No screening)  S (Screening) 
N    ( )NNNN ΠΠ ( )SNNS ΠΠ  
 
S    ( )NSSN ΠΠ ( )SSSS ΠΠ  
B
ank L
Note: The payoff in each state is depicted in the order of (Bank L, Bank R). 
 
2
t
NN
⋅≅Π θ , 
 
2
32
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅≅Π θ
αθ t
tSN
, 
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 dNS rtt
⋅−⋅−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +⋅≅Π )1()1(
32
2
εθθ
αθ , 
)()1()1(
2
αεεθθ +⋅⋅−⋅−−⋅≅Π dSS rt . 
It can be seen that the relation SNNN Π>Π  always holds. That is, when a bank does 
not carry out screening, the other bank will not carry out screening, either. Given this, 
two cases can be considered: First, when α  is large and SSNS Π>Π , non-screening 
is the dominant strategy and non-screening equilibrium is Nash equilibrium. Second, 
when α  is small and , both non-screening equilibrium and screening 
equilibrium are Nash equilibrium. 
NSSS Π>Π
    The condition of multiple equilibria, NSSS Π>Π , is equivalent to 
 
( ) drt
t
⋅−⋅−<⋅−⋅−++⋅⋅⋅⋅
22 )1()1()1()1(6
18
1 εθαεθαθαθ . (7) 
Substituting Assumption (A1) yields 
 
( ) drt
t
⋅−⋅−<⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⋅−+<⋅−⋅−++⋅⋅⋅⋅
22 )1()1()1()1(
3
10)1()1(6
18
1 εθαεθαεθαθαθ . 
         (7’) 
In the second inequality, rearranging terms results in the following: 
 
)1()1(
3
10
)1()1( 2
εθ
εθα
−⋅−+
−⋅−<dr  .     (7”) 
It can be confirmed that 0<⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
dr
α
ε  and 0<⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
dr
α
θ . As a whole, these suggest 
that the case of multiple equilibria (both screening and non-screening equilibrium are 
Nash equilibrium) is likely to take place when the cost of screening relative to the 
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deposit rate is low, the accuracy of screening is high (i.e., smaller ε ), or when the 
proportion of good type firms is high. 
 
2.3  Welfare Analysis 
An important issue in this analysis is efficiency of equilibrium in terms of social 
welfare. Defining social welfare as the sum of profits of both banks and firms, social 
welfare in non-screening and screening equilibrium can be calculated. 
    The social welfare of the two equilibria can be compared implicitly by weighing 
the costs of screening against loan losses from wasteful lending to bad type firms. 
When both banks do not carry out screening, the aggregated loan loss of the two banks 
is . On the other hand, when both banks carry out screening, the aggregate 
loan loss is reduced to  while screening incurs costs of 
dr⋅− )1( θ
dr⋅⋅−⋅−+− εεθθ )]1()1()1[(
αεθθθ ⋅−⋅−+−+ )]1()1()1([  for the two banks as a whole. Weighing losses and 
costs, screening equilibrium is associated with higher social welfare on the condition 
that 
 
)1()1(1
)1()1( 2
εθ
εθα
−⋅−+
−⋅−<dr .      (8) 
In other words, this inequality indicates the range where screening technology saves 
more than it costs. Similar to the condition of multiple equilibria (7”), it can be 
confirmed that with regard to (8) 0<⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
dr
α
ε  and 0<⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
dr
α
θ . From (7”) and (8), 
efficiency of equilibrium can be summarized in Figure 1.7 In this figure, the horizontal 
axis is drα . A higher drα is associated with non-screening equilibrium. The 
shaded range represents Inequality (8). As far as this shaded area is concerned, 
                                                  
7 From (A1), in terms of drα  Inequality (8) is more binding than Inequality (7). 
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non-screening equilibrium is possible and it is inferior equilibrium. 
 
Figure 1. Efficiency of Equilibrium 
 
 
((7”) holds.) 
 
((7”) does not hold.) 
 
 
 
 
 
)1()1(1
)1()1( 2
εθ
εθ
−⋅−+
−⋅−  
 
 
 
In summary, screening technology is said to be effici
screening α  is low in relation to the deposit rate, accuracy
proportion of good types in the population of firms. In th
equilibrium is inferior equilibrium in terms of social welfare. 
 
 
3 POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
The previous analysis shows that banking competition may
utilization of screening technology. However, not only econom
policies to enhance market competition between banks m
information production. After providing support for this propo
the “interest supplementation scheme” is proposed. This scheme
bank competition from being bound to inferior equilibrium. 
 
 - 14 - dr
α  Multiple equilibria Non-screening equilibriument when the cost of 
 of screening, and the 
is case, non-screening 
 result in insufficient 
ic conditions but also 
ay produce such less 
sition, a policy termed 
 is designed to prevent 
   
3.1 Competition-enhancing Policies and Information Production 
From the view of the social welfare, banks may undertake pre-loan screening in less 
than the optimal levels due to competition. Such circumstances are associated with not 
only economic booms but also policies implemented to enhance competition between 
banks. With regard to Inequality (1), both of the two banks are monopolistic if the 
following holds; 
 
 
2
1ˆ0
0)ˆ*(
<<
=⋅+−
d
tdrλ
      (9) 
The term *r  is the equilibrium lending rate, and  represents the share of banks. In 
this case, the credit market is divided, and two banks do not compete directly. Further, 
there is no divergence between the optimizing behavior of a monopolistic bank and the 
choice of screening intensity from the social welfare viewpoint. A monopolistic bank 
will always undertake screening as long as the screening technology is efficient enough 
to satisfy the following: 
dˆ
 
 )1()1( εθα −⋅−<dr .      (10) 
In other words, banks can completely utilize screening technology in the monopolistic 
state. This is because banks can fully redirect the costs of screening to borrowers 
without fear that competitors will erode market share. 
Solving the monopolistic bank’s problem, (9) can be rewritten as; 
 
 .      (9’) θθλ ⋅<−⋅< tr d0
Inequality (9’) shows the economic conditions under which banks can enjoy a 
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monopoly and fully make use of screening technology. Thus, it is quite possible that 
economic slowdowns (i.e., lower productivity and smaller proportion of good types in 
the population of firms) give rise to bank monopolies as well as sufficient information 
production. Nonetheless, monopolistic equilibrium is accompanied by social costs. 
Although information production is sufficient, the supply of loans is smaller in a 
monopolistic equilibrium than in a competitive one. Fewer firms can receive loans in a 
monopolistic equilibrium. 
In contrast, when the economy is in a boom (i.e., higher λ  and )θ  and (9’) is 
not satisfied, banking competition emerges, and this may result in less information 
production. Analogously, policies to enhance competition and curtail the oligopolistic 
power t of each bank would invite competition. On the one hand, such 
competition-enhancing policies would increase the supply of loans relative to a 
monopolistic state. On the other hand, such policies might destabilize the banking 
sector because information production activities might be reduced under competition, 
and this could result in higher loan losses. 
 
3.2 Interest Supplementation 
A public intervention scheme can be considered that is designed to prevent banking 
competition from falling into the inferior non-screening equilibrium in the presence of 
efficient screening technology. Specifically, the “interest supplementation scheme” can 
be proposed. Firms that pass the bank’s pre-lending screening can get a government 
subsidy for part of their interest cost at the time of repayment. The government can 
balance expenditures by levying taxes on firm profits.  
Regardless of the scheme, the payoff of banks would be the same except in the 
case where banks are each taking a different strategy (i.e., (screening, non-screening)). 
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Therefore, payoffs of banks have to be examined only relative to asymmetric 
equilibrium. Denote with ϖ  the interest supplementation that the government gives 
to each of those firms that repay their debt to the screening bank. When one bank 
carries out screening, the share of the non-screening bank in the population of the good 
type firms is; 
 
1
2
)(0 <−−+=<
t
rrtd SNS
ϖ .     (11) 
Solving the maximization problem of banks, the equilibrium interest rates and profits 
are derived as follows: 
 
33
2)1(
*
ϖ
θ
α
θ
εθθ ++⋅−++≅ dSN rtr , 
2
* 332
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−⋅≅Π θ
ϖαθ t
tSN
, 
33
)1(
*
ϖ
θ
α
θ
εθθ −+⋅−++≅ dNS rtr ,  dNS rtt ⋅−⋅−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+⋅≅Π )1()1(
332
2
* εθθ
ϖαθ . 
where  and *SNΠ *NSΠ  represent the profits of the screening bank and non-screening 
bank under the scheme, respectively. 
To eliminate inferior equilibrium, an intervention scheme must be such that a 
screening strategy becomes the dominant strategy. The conditions can be written as;  
 
NNSN Π>Π * : 2332
2 tt
t
⋅>⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−⋅ θθ
ϖαθ ,     (12) 
SSNS Π<Π * : )()1()1(2)1()1(332
2
αεεθθεθθ
ϖαθ +⋅⋅−⋅−−⋅<⋅−⋅−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+⋅ dd rtrt
t
 
         (13) 
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NNΠ  and  are from Table 1. From (12), SSΠ ω  must be greater than θα ⋅ . Setting 
δθθαω ⋅+⋅= 3 , where 0≅δ , and substituting into (13), the conditions can be 
approximated as; 
 
 
)1()1(
)1()1( 2
εθ
εθα
−⋅−
−⋅−<dr .      (13’) 
Since (13’) always holds in the range of Inequality (8), the interest supplementation 
scheme is feasible. It helps the credit market to avoid being bound by inferior 
non-screening equilibrium in the presence of efficient screening technology. 
Further, all the government has to do is to announce the scheme, and it is not 
required to mobilize any resources among firms. As subsidies are provided only at the 
time of repayment, those firms who default on their loans cannot claim them. Thus, 
those who receive subsidies coincide with firms with tax levies. There is no transfer 
among firms. 
 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Analysis has been presented on the information production activities of banks in 
duopoly where they simultaneously determine the intensity of pre-loan screening as 
well as interest rates. When a bank intensifies screening, it faces a trade-off. 
Intensifying screening may improve the quality of loan portfolios, but it may also be 
accompanied by a rise in the lending interest rate due to the cost of screening, and this 
may lead to a loss in the bank’s share of the credit market. Due to strategic 
complementarities between banks, banking competition can result in inferior 
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equilibrium out of multiple equilibria and insufficient information production. 
The preliminary model of this paper provides an account of the phenomena where 
loan losses increase in the aftermath of lending booms and intense competition of 
banks in expanding loans. An economic boom as well as competition enhancing 
policies may give rise to a greater loan supply but less pre-loan screening. When the 
economy is slow or banks have strong market power, banks tend to behave as 
monopolies. In such a state, there is no divergence between the monopolistic bank’s 
optimizing behavior and the choice of information production from the viewpoint of 
social welfare. Rather, divergence can emerge through competition. Policymakers must 
take into account the possible destabilizing effects of competition enhancing policies. 
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